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When firms recruit inventors, they acquire not only the use of their skills but also enhanced access
to their stock of ideas. But do hiring firms actually increase their use of the new recruits’ prior inventions?
Our estimates suggest they do, quite significantly in fact, by approximately 202% on average. However,
this does not necessarily reflect widespread “learning-by-hiring.” In fact, we estimate that a recruit’s
exploitation of her own prior ideas accounts for almost half of the above effect. Furthermore, although
one might expect the recruit’s role to diminish rapidly as her tacit knowledge diffuses across her new
firm, our estimates indicate that her importance is surprisingly persistent over time. We base these
findings on an empirical strategy that exploits the variation over time in hiring firms’ citations to the
recruits’ pre-move patents. Specifically, we employ a difference-in-differences approach to compare
pre-move versus post-move citation rates for the recruits’ prior patents and the corresponding matched-pair
control patents. Our methodology has three benefits compared to previous studies that also examine
the link between labor mobility and knowledge flow: 1) it does not suffer from the upward bias inherent
in the conventional cross-sectional comparison, 2) it generates results that are robust to a more stringently
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The link between recruiting inventors and using their ideas is important, yet we know surprisingly 
little about it. There is a broad consensus that innovation is central to many firms’ strategies and the basis 
for their competitive advantage. Yet a firm’s past experience and extant stock of knowledge constrains 
innovation, making the innovation trajectory highly path dependent (Nelson and Winter 1982, Dosi 
1988). Firms need to balance this natural tendency towards exploitation of familiar knowledge with 
deliberate mechanisms that facilitate exploration of distant knowledge (March 1991), especially since 
combining ideas drawn from different sources is important for innovation success (Weitzman 1998, 
Fleming 2001, Chesbrough 2003). Thus, recruiting an individual from outside the organization may 
enhance a firm’s access to external ideas and thus better enable it to complement exploitation of native 
ideas with exploration of foreign ideas. But how much do firms really increase their use of a new recruit’s 
stock of prior ideas? Furthermore, to the extent they do, how do they do it? To what extent do firms really 
exhibit “learning-by-hiring”? Moreover, given the temporal nature of diffusion, how does this process 
evolve over time after the new recruit settles in? We set out to address these questions. 
Scholars from a variety of schools of thought have suggested that inter-firm mobility could be a 
key mechanism driving diffusion of ideas across firms. Noting that knowledge spillovers through 
mobility often take place even despite the source firm’s use of legal measures to prevent them, economist 
Kenneth Arrow (1962: 615) remarks: “Mobility of personnel among firms provides a way of spreading 
information. Legally imposed property rights can provide only a partial barrier, since there are obviously 
enormous difficulties in defining in any sharp way an item of information and differentiating it from other 
similar sounding items.” Proponents of institutional theory, such as DiMaggio and Powell (1983), suggest 
that inter-firm movement of personnel is a particularly important mechanism through which innovations 
diffuse among competitors in an industry. Analogously, the resource-based view of the firm    2
acknowledges that recruitment from outside can enable firms to bypass constraints on growth imposed by 
relying solely on internally grown resources and capabilities (Penrose 1959, Barney 1991).
1  
At an aggregate level, scholars have also linked regional economic growth to enhanced access to 
ideas afforded by inter-firm mobility. In her monograph on regional advantage, Saxenian (1994: 34-37) 
characterizes the relationship between recruiting and access to ideas as central to explaining the 
exceptional economic growth of Northern California: “Silicon Valley was quickly distinguished by 
unusually high levels of job hopping. During the 1970s, average annual employee turnover exceeded 35 
percent in local electronics firms and was as high as 59 percent in small firms.... Early efforts to take legal 
action against departed employees proved inconclusive or protracted, and most firms came to accept high 
turnover as a cost of business in the region.... This decentralized and fluid environment accelerated the 
diffusion of technological capabilities and know-how within the region.” Several studies that examine the 
effects of restrictions on inter-firm mobility due to non-compete covenants find support for this view 
(Franco and Mitchell 2008, Marx et al. 2009, Samila and Sorenson 2009). Furthermore, some formal 
models of economic growth explicitly cite the possibility of knowledge spillovers through inter-firm 
mobility as one way of justifying a key assumption regarding technological knowledge being at least in 
part a “non-excludable” good (Grossman and Helpman 1991). 
While the above research assumes a link between mobility and knowledge flow, several studies 
explicitly estimate aspects of this relationship, particularly in the context of mobile inventors. In one of 
the first such studies, Almeida and Kogut (1999) show that locations with greater intra-regional labor 
mobility between firms tend to have more localized knowledge flows. In another pioneering study, Song 
et al. (2003) illustrate that mobile inventors build upon ideas from their previous firms more often than 
inventors at the hiring firm who have not previously worked at that other firm. In yet another influential 
article, Rosenkopf and Almeida (2003) examine firm pairs and show that dyads that experience more 
                                                           
1 Our explicit focus is on an individual moving from one firm to another existing firm. It is important to note that an 
extensive literature also emphasizes knowledge transfer through mobility in the context of new firm formation 
(Agarwal et al. 2004, Gompers et al. 2005, Klepper and Sleeper 2005).    3
labor mobility between them also demonstrate greater subsequent knowledge flow. Taken together, these 
empirical studies have inspired further research employing similar data and methods to sharpen our 
understanding of various aspects of the mobility-knowledge flow relationship (e.g., Agrawal et al. 2006, 
Oettl and Agrawal 2008, Agarwal et al. 2009, Corredoira and Rosenkopf 2010).
2 
The above studies have advanced the field significantly by establishing an empirical link between 
mobility and knowledge flow and providing insights into particular nuances of this relationship. However, 
they are subject to two related limitations associated with drawing causal inferences from cross-sectional 
data on inventor mobility and knowledge use across patents. The first limitation concerns unobserved 
heterogeneity. The destination firm may be more likely to use an idea that is of inherently higher quality 
or has greater firm-specific relevance, irrespective of whether the destination firm hires the inventor. 
However, since the inventor is also likely to be a more attractive target for recruitment, this presents a 
selection problem wherein the observed cross-sectional correlation between mobility and knowledge use 
overestimates the true effect of mobility. The second concerns the endogeneity of a firm’s decision to 
hire. A firm may be more inclined to recruit an individual who works in a domain that the firm intends to 
focus on in the future. This could coincide with the firm also employing other mechanisms to improve its 
access to external knowledge in that domain (including the recruit’s prior stock of ideas). This would 
again produce a mobility-knowledge flow correlation without the former being a (fully) causal precursor 
of the latter. Not accounting for such endogeneity will once more lead to an upward bias if we interpret 
the estimates as boosts in the use of ideas caused by an instance of mobility.
3  
Recognizing these inherent limitations of a cross-sectional research design for making causal 
inferences, Rosenkopf and Almeida (2003: 764) offer this challenge: “Future research should attempt to 
                                                           
2 While we focus on the direct effect of inter-firm mobility on knowledge transfer, it is worth noting that mobility 
also influences the structure of interpersonal networks within and across firms, which in turn play an important role 
in further shaping knowledge diffusion patterns (Singh 2005, Fleming et al. 2007, Breschi and Lissoni 2009). 
3 To be clear, prior literature does attempt to deal with the aforementioned issues by using technologically matched 
control patents as a benchmark for cross-sectional comparison. However, given necessarily imperfect matching, 
such challenges are unavoidable in any cross-sectional research design. The concerns become particularly salient in 
the typical mobility-related study that employs the relatively aggregate three-digit technology match, as that is 
surely too coarse to sufficiently capture all relevant characteristics of the underlying knowledge.    4
utilize fully developed longitudinal databases to explore all possible temporal and causal links.” We take 
up that challenge here and make significant progress on the first problem (unobserved heterogeneity) and 
at least some progress on the second (endogeneity). 
So, in addition to offering an empirical contribution in terms of estimating the boost in use of a 
recruit’s prior ideas as well as the fraction of that boost that is due to the recruit herself, our methodology 
advances existing research on mobility and knowledge flows in three significant ways. First, we base our 
analysis not on aggregate firm-level citation counts but on disaggregated data that capture changes over 
time in how individuals in recruiting firms cite a specific patent. Second, we employ a “difference-in-
differences” (DD) approach to account for heterogeneity across patents. This avoids making the typical 
(strong) assumption regarding comparability of the levels of citations received by “focal” patents (i.e., 
those involving an inventor who subsequently moves) and “control” patents (i.e., other similar patents). 
Instead, our identification strategy relies upon a weaker (and hence more defensible) assumption 
regarding the legitimacy of comparing relative changes in citation rates over time (in particular from the 
pre-move to the post-move period). Third, to further address concerns regarding comparability of the 
focal and control patents even despite these weaker assumptions, we replicate our initial analysis (which 
relies upon a conventional matching approach) using a sample based on a more stringent matching 
procedure that also takes into account the patent’s pre-move citation patterns and the inventor’s prior 
patenting history in determining the control sample.
4 
We begin our analysis with a sample we construct using the matching criteria most prior studies 
employ to identify control patents that are used as a baseline against which to compare focal patents: the 
three-digit technology classification and the application year.
5 The typical cross-sectional comparison of 
the post-move citation levels for focal versus control patents rests on the (often unstated) assumption that 
                                                           
4 Admittedly, even our exploitation of longitudinal data, implementation of DD estimation, and use of more 
stringent matching do not fully establish causality. As discussed in the concluding section, doing so would require a 
suitable instrument or a natural experiment that randomly assigns the “treatment” (in our case, the “mobility event”). 
5 Jaffe et al. (1993) pioneer this matching procedure. Thompson and Fox-Kean (2005) propose refinements to this 
technology-based matching while also discussing the inherent challenges of using any such approach.    5
the above technology-based match suffices in dealing with the heterogeneity issue mentioned above. 
However, we find evidence that this assumption is not reasonable; destination firms cite focal patents at a 
higher rate than matched control patents even before the move. In recognition of this systematic 
difference between focal and control patents, we use the DD approach to essentially “difference out” the 
pre-move citation premium associated with focal patents. This allows us to distinguish the component of 
the post-move citation rate that is more likely due to the “treatment” (attributable to the move) from the 
component that is due to “selection” (attributable to the kind of inventor who is more likely to move). 
To further address concerns regarding the closeness of matching that acts as our baseline, we 
repeat our DD estimation using a different control sample constructed by employing a more stringent 
matching procedure. We implement this using “coarsened exact matching” (CEM) (Iacus et al. 2009). 
Among the additional matching criteria is information related to the patents’ pre-move citations received 
as well as the inventors’ career histories. As the extensive literature on matching emphasizes, using 
appropriately stringent matching may reduce endogeneity concerns (though can rarely eliminate them 
completely) while also reducing the sensitivity of the subsequent regression-based estimation on specific 
functional form assumptions. In our case, including pre-move citation counts (overall as well as from the 
destination firm) among these criteria helps to eliminate the pre-move citation rate differences between 
focal and control patents, improving their comparability in terms of expected future citation rates. 
We find that hiring an inventor is associated with a firm subsequently increasing its use of the 
new recruit’s prior ideas significantly: by approximately 202% on average (even after controlling for 
changes in the firm’s propensity to cite other similar inventions). In absolute terms, the destination firm 
increases its annual citation rate from 0.0140 to 0.0396 citations per year for each of the recruit’s prior 
ideas.
6 We show that this result is robust to a variety of specifications. In fact, we find the DD estimates 
using the more stringent matching to be essentially the same qualitatively and very similar quantitatively.  
                                                           
6 For the reader who might be wondering why these absolute values look so small, note that these represent citations 
from a particular firm to a particular patent in a particular year.    6
Having estimated the extent to which a destination firm uses its new recruit’s prior ideas, we next 
turn our attention to examining the mechanism through which the firm accomplishes this. The extant 
literature emphasizes the idea of “learning-by-hiring” (Song et al. 2003, Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003), 
which effectively assumes that the recruit’s tacit knowledge diffuses internally and becomes a part of the 
firm’s overall knowledge base shortly upon the recruit’s arrival. However, Simon (1991: 126) cautions 
against such assumptions: “We must be careful about reifying the organization and talking about it as 
‘knowing’ something or ‘learning’ something. It is usually important to specify where in the organization 
particular knowledge is stored, or who has learned it.... Since what has been learned is stored in individual 
heads, its transience or permanence depends on what people leave behind them when they depart from an 
organization or move from one position to another. Has what they have learned been transmitted to others 
or stored in ways that will permit it to be recovered when relevant?” 
The above remark motivates our next set of analyses, where we distinguish between self-
exploitation of the recruit's prior ideas and increased usage by others in the firm. Our results support 
Simon’s observation. We discover that almost half of the boost in the use of the recruit’s prior ideas is due 
to the recruit herself building upon her prior ideas after arriving at her new firm.
7 Furthermore, when we 
exclude citations by the recruit’s collaborators, we find that other inventors account for only a third of the 
overall boost realized by the hiring firm. When we further examine the temporal patterns of citations, 
expecting that the role of the recruit might start to diminish shortly after she arrives as her tacit knowledge 
diffuses throughout the destination firm, we instead find that her role remains quite persistent over time. 
These findings suggests the need to temper the prevalent learning-by-hiring view with a 
recognition that, at least in our sample, we must attribute almost half of the knowledge boost to what can 
better be described as “hiring-to-exploit-ideas.” This has important implications for how we should 
interpret the mobility-knowledge flow link, given that reliance on a single employee for an important 
                                                           
7Our results are consistent with the findings of Tzabbar et al. (2009), who report that having the recruit on an 
inventing team in the destination firm significantly increases the likelihood of the team exploiting one of the 
recruit’s prior inventions.    7
piece of knowledge may confer significant bargaining power to that individual, especially if she also has 
other outside options (Becker 1962, Lazear 1986, Coff 1997, Moen 2005, Groysberg et al. 2008). The 
significant role of the recruit in building upon her prior ideas might therefore imply that the recruit rather 
than the hiring firm captures much of the rents associated with the firm’s seemingly better access to her 
prior knowledge. This echoes Peteraf’s (1993: 187) remark: “A Nobel Prize-winning scientist may be a 
unique resource, but unless he has firm-specific ties, his perfect mobility makes him an unlikely source of 
sustainable advantage.” 
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. In Section 2, we outline our empirical 
framework and distinguish it from the traditional cross-sectional approach. In Section 3, we describe the 
construction of our two datasets, one corresponding to the conventional matching and the other based on 
more stringent matching criteria. In Section 4, we present our empirical results. Finally, in Section 5, we 
discuss implications of our findings, limitations of our study, and potential directions for future research. 
 
2. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1. Patent data, mobility, and the use of ideas 
Micro-level data suitable for examining the link between mobility and knowledge flow is hard 
to come by. A notable exception is patent data, which researchers have commonly employed for this 
purpose as they include detailed information on patent characteristics including inventor names, 
application and grant dates, assignee organization name (if any), technological classification, etc. In 
particular, patent data enable the researcher to infer inter-firm mobility by chronologically tracing 
individual inventors as they appear on patents assigned to different firms at different times.  
In addition, data on the citations a patent receives allow the researcher to infer when a 
subsequent invention has used a particular idea.
8 Admittedly, citations are not a perfect measure of 
                                                           
8 Using citations as a measure of knowledge flows does not assume that citations are a mechanism behind these 
flows. As an analogy, a PhD student’s citations of his advisor’s research papers suggests that he has built upon the 
    8
knowledge flows. For example, they are often added for reasons such as avoiding litigation or 
clarifying claims, and many are even added by patent examiners rather than the inventors themselves. 
Despite this, however, scholars have shown that they correlate quite well with actual knowledge flow, 




2.2. The cross-sectional approach  
We begin our empirical analysis by implementing a method of examining the link between 
mobility and knowledge flow that follows the “best practice” from existing studies. First, we create a 
sample of patents representing ideas developed by inventors who subsequently change firms. We refer to 
these as “focal patents.” Second, we match each focal patent with a comparable “control patent” with the 
same three-digit technology class and application year. Finally, we examine cross-sectional differences 
between the focal and control patents in terms of the number of citations they receive from the destination 
firm (the firm that recruits the focal inventor) in the time period following the move. 
Formally, we define CITESi,t as the number of citations a patent i (focal or control) receives from 
the destination firm in year t (any year following the move). The cross-sectional estimation equation we 
employ (using observations just from the post-move period) is: 
(1)      ) ( , ) ( , t i i X t i appyear t i R t i X RECRUIT f CITES              
Here, RECRUITi is an indicator variable that equals one for observations corresponding to a focal 
patent and zero for the corresponding control patent. Rather than assuming a specific functional form for 
the temporal patterns of citations, the above model follows a non-parametric approach by more flexibly 
accounting for patent age (using yearly indicator variables for the gap between patent i’s application year 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
advisor’s ideas, even if he actually has acquired those ideas by working closely with the advisor rather than by 
reading his papers. 
9 A specific concern is whether including examiner-added citations biases results (Alcacer and Gittelman 2006). 
However, to the extent that inventors have strategic motives for omitting citations, including examiner-added 
citations is actually desirable (Lampe 2008). While we would have liked to do a robustness analysis dropping 
examiner-added citations, these data are not available in machine-readable form for our study's time period.    9
and the citing year t being considered) and citing year (using different indicator variables for each 
calendar year t).  
The baseline expectation is that ψF should be positive and significant.  In other words, patents by 
individuals who subsequently move from their original firm (the source firm) to the destination firm will 
be more highly cited (by inventors at the destination firm after the mobility event) than control patents. 
The vector Xi represents the variables we use to control for variation in key observables associated with 
the destination firm, the source firm, the inventor, and the patent. We describe these variables in Section 
3.2 below and list them (except for technology area indicators) for easy reference in Table 1.   
Unfortunately, a cross-sectional approach like the one above is not satisfactory for dealing with 
the unobserved heterogeneity across inventors and their patents. For example, better inventors may 
generate higher-quality ideas (that naturally receive more citations from others, including from the 
destination firm) and might also be more sought after as new recruits. A focal patent is also more likely to 
come from a specific knowledge domain of greater relevance for the destination firm, despite the 
corresponding control being drawn from the same broad three-digit technology class. In either case, the 
recruit’s patent would receive more citations from the destination firm, irrespective of the move. To better 
identify that component of the boost in knowledge use that is directly attributable to the move, we next 
turn to a “difference-in-differences” research design that allows us to distinguish between the component 
of the boost in post-move citation rate that is more likely due to the “treatment” (attributable to the move) 
and the component that is instead due to “selection” (attributable to the kind of inventor who is more 
likely to move).  
 
2.3. Our “difference-in-differences” approach  
Our “difference-in-differences” (DD) approach for examining the mobility-knowledge flow link 
exploits the fact that we observe citations received by the focal and control patents not just post-move but 
also in the years preceding the move. While post-move differences confound actual mobility-related 
knowledge acquisition with differences in quality and/or relevance, we can at least partly identify these    10
effects by taking into account differences in citation rates that exist even pre-move. In other words, we 
can use a pre-move difference in citation rates for focal versus control patents as a benchmark against 
which to compare the post-move difference, helping us better identify the component of the post-move 
difference that we can attribute to the move itself.
10  
We provide Figure 1 to illustrate how the DD approach conceptually differs from the cross-
sectional approach described above. For ease of exposition, the figure depicts the effect of mobility as a 
sudden jump in what would have been the otherwise natural evolution of the citation rate of the focal 
patent over time (our actual empirical analysis relaxes this assumption).
11 The cross-sectional approach 
above interprets a positive difference in post-mobility citation rates for the recruit’s patent (Ra) versus 
control patent (Ca) as evidence of knowledge flow attributable to the mobility event. However, that is 
misleading because had the move not taken place, then the expected citation rate to the recruit’s patent 
(Re) would still be greater than that for the control patent (Ce). Comparing citation rates between the 
recruit and control patents both before and after the move allows us to better estimate how the temporal 
pattern in citation rate changes from the extrapolated path for the post-move period. In other words, the 
DD logic suggests that we can better capture the effect attributable to the mobility event not by the extent 
to which Ra > Ca but by the extent to which Ra – Re > Ca  - Ce.  
Implementing the above logic needs a patent-year dataset that includes observations from the 
years not just after but also before the move. Defining POSTMOVEi,t as zero when the year t falls in the 
pre-move period and one when it falls in the post-move period for a patent i (focal or control), the 
estimation equation becomes: 
(2)      
)
* (
, ) ( ,
, ,
t i i X t i appyear t t i P
t i i RP i R t i
X POSTMOVE
POSTMOVE RECRUIT RECRUIT f CITES
    
 




                                                           
10 For a good overview of the “difference-in-differences” methodology, see Chapter 5 in Angrist and Pischke 
(2009). See Furman and Stern (2006) and Murray and Stern (2007) for instructive applications in the context of 
citations. 
11 Note that we allow for the possibility of a post-mobility bump even for the control patent. This could happen, for 
example, if the move coincides with an overall shift in a firm’s technological focus, resulting in a general increase in 
citation rate for the given technology. In the discussion section, we offer alternate interpretations.    11
Here, ψR captures systematic differences in the focal versus control patents that exist even before the 
move, and ψP captures systematic shifts in how the destination firm increases its use of ideas in this 
technology area between the pre- and post-move periods, irrespective of recruiting that particular 
inventor. If mobility really does lead to an increased use in the recruit’s prior knowledge, ψRP should be 
positive and significant in the estimation.  
While the above framework allows for a systematic difference between focal and control patents, 
we can generalize it further to allow even individual patents to be different in unobserved ways (e.g., due 
to inventor characteristics we do not observe). In particular, we employ patent fixed effects analysis to 
detect “abnormal” within-patent changes in the citation rate to a patent after an inventor moves. The 
estimation relies on a deviation in the patent’s post-mobility citation rate from an expected rate, where we 
derive the expected rate by extrapolating from the pre-move citation rate and assuming a temporal trend 
analogous to other patents from the same technology-year cohort. We express this model as:  
(3)      
)
* (
, ) ( ,
, ,
t i i t i appyear t t i P
t i i RP t i
POSTMOVE
POSTMOVE RECRUIT f CITES
    





Here, i reflects the fixed (time invariant) effect corresponding to patent i. Since the fixed effect absorbs 
unique patent characteristics, note that the model no longer includes direct effects of time-invariant, 
patent-level variables (RECRUITi and Xi in the previous models). However, we can still estimate the DD 
coefficient ψRP as it is based on an interaction effect.
12  
 
2.4. A more stringent matching approach 
Intuitively, it is helpful to think of the above DD research design as replacing the conventional 
assumption of direct comparability between focal and control patents of post-move citation rate levels 
with the weaker assumption of comparability in terms of pre- and post-move citation rate trends. 
                                                           
12 See Murray and Stern (2007) for a similar specification. Since the lag between the patent application and the 
move varies across focal patents, it is possible to carry out the estimation using just these patents. While we report 
findings from such an analysis as well (effectively estimating the difference between Ra and Re in Figure 1), our 
preferred approach is to use a sample that includes appropriately matched control patents.     12
However, even this weaker identifying assumption is subject to criticism given that the underlying sample 
based on the conventional matching criterion (three-digit technology class and application year) might not 
produce a control sample that is sufficiently similar to the focal patents. In particular, since inter-firm 
mobility is an endogenous event, it seems particularly important to construct a control sample that 
matches the focal sample as closely as possible on observed characteristics.  
As we describe in detail in Section 3 below, we employ a CEM procedure to construct a control 
sample based on discrete buckets for pre-move citations received by the patent (both overall and from the 
destination firm) as well as the patenting history of the inventor (in terms of the number of past patents 
and age in terms of years since the first patent).
13 Note that we employ these criteria in addition to exact 
matching (as before) on the conventional criteria of application year and three-digit technology class. We 
also use the grant delay (i.e., the lag between the application and grant date) as yet another matching 
criterion for the CEM. This improves comparability of the focal and control patents by allowing for the 
possibility that the grant delay itself may be a result of important (and possibly unobserved) patent-level 
characteristics and/or that the start of a patent's “citation clock” is more appropriately modeled using its 
grant date rather than its application date (Mehta et al. 2010). 
 
2.5. Our preferred specification 
Since patent citations involve count data skewed to the right (and over-dispersed relative to 
Poisson), scholars commonly employ negative binomial models for estimating parameters. For 
comparability with previous research, we therefore start with negative binomial regressions. Our models 
employ robust standard errors with clustering on the inventor in order to account for non-independence of 
observations pertaining to the same cited patent and to different patents involving the same inventor. We 
then implement analogous regressions using the corresponding linear (OLS) models, which have the 
benefit of allowing more fine-grained indicator variables for technology (at the three-digit level rather 
                                                           
13 For a description of CEM, see Iacus et al. (2009). For a nice application, see Azoulay et al. (2010).    13
than two-digit level practical for non-linear models), inventor location (U.S. state or non-U.S. country), 
inventor age (in years), and grant delay (in months).  
For our preferred implementation of DD, however, we employ patent fixed effects to better 
address concerns regarding unobserved heterogeneity across patents (e.g., differences in the intrinsic 
quality or relevance to the destination firm that the pooled models do not capture). We first try 
implementing the above using a conditional fixed effects Poisson framework (Wooldridge 1999).
14 
However, in addition to the usual challenges with interpreting DD coefficients in non-linear models 
(especially when comparing across different models), we run into two issues specific to our setting. First, 
the model does not converge when we include yearly indicator variables for the patent age and the 
calendar year of citation to better saturate the models. Second, we must drop a very large fraction of the 
sample due to no variation in the dependent variable (because of zero citations), and the observations 
dropped are disproportionately control patents. As a result, our preferred approach is to employ fully 
saturated linear regression specifications with patent fixed effects.
15  
 
3. DATASET CONSTRUCTION 
3.1. Constructing matched samples of focal and control patents 
We merge patent data obtained directly from the USPTO with patent data made available by 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (Chapter 13 in Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2002) and the 
National University of Singapore-Melbourne Business School patent dataset. We then enhance these 
along two dimensions. First, for each assigned patent, we determine the assignee organization by 
                                                           
14 We implement this in Stata using the “xtqmlp” procedure (written by Tim Simcoe and available for download at 
http://people.bu.edu/tsimcoe/code/xtpqml.txt), which corrects the standard errors from a fixed effects Poisson model 
for over-dispersion. This procedure addresses the concerns regarding interpreting a conditional fixed effects 
negative binomial model as a true fixed effects estimator (Wooldridge 1999, Allison and Waterman 2002).  
15 We verify that our findings are qualitatively robust to using pooled negative binomial estimation or Poisson 
conditional fixed effects estimation, even though this typically means that the specification is not saturated as well 
and/or that we drop a significant fraction of the sample. For further discussion on the tradeoffs involved in 
employing linear models versus more sophisticated regression techniques, see Angrist and Pischke (2009).     14
carrying out an assignee name cleanup followed by a parent-subsidiary match.
16 Second, we use not 
just inventor names but also other data fields (i.e., technology classification, inventor address, 
collaborator names, citation information) to create a unique identifier for each inventor on all patents.
17   
In order to obtain a dataset of reasonable size while allowing for a sufficient future time window 
for observing subsequent inventor mobility and citations, we start with the population of patents with 
application years 1981-1990 (across all technology classes). In detecting instances of subsequent inter-
firm mobility, we follow other researchers and infer mobility through observed changes in the assignee 
firm on successive patents filed by an inventor (Almeida and Kogut 1999, Song et al. 2003).
18  
We restrict our sample (both focal and control) to patents with a single inventor to facilitate 
straightforward comparability across patents (all have the same number of inventors: one) and an 
unambiguous conceptualization of inter-firm mobility (or lack thereof) for any given patent. From this 
subset, we draw our sample of focal patents for which the inventor exhibits inter-firm mobility anytime 
between (and including) the
 third and
 tenth year following the application year (we exclude the first and 
last two years so that there is at least some pre- and post-move citation data for each patent in order to 
facilitate meaningful DD calculation even when we employ cited patent fixed effects).  
One challenge is that, even when we do observe two successive patents from the same 
inventor but at different firms, we cannot pinpoint the inventor’s exact move date within this window.  
We thus base all analyses reported in this paper on mobility events for which this window is four years 
                                                           
16 We follow the assignee matching procedure used by Singh (2005), who relies upon NBER Compustat identifiers, 
Stopford’s Directory of Multinationals, Who Owns Who directories, and Internet sources. To further reduce any 
possibility of misclassifying different spellings, name changes, acquisitions, etc. as instances of mobility, we have 
had a research assistant manually double-check instances of algorithmically detected mobility. 
17 We base our name matching approach on Singh (2008), whose algorithms are similar to procedures implemented 
by Trajtenberg (2006) and Fleming et al. (2007). 
18 Patent data is only effective for identifying instances of mobility where an inventor successfully files for patents 
both pre- and post-move. This is sufficient in a setting (like ours) where one does not need to measure the overall 
extent of mobility. However, even in our setting, systematically ignoring certain types of mobility could produce 
biases in either direction. One could imagine cases where a recruit does not patent post-move because her role is 
now just to transfer knowledge to others (e.g., as a technical manager), in which omitting her from the sample leads 
to a downward bias. On the other hand, if she stops patenting and also stops transferring knowledge (e.g., her 
knowledge becomes outdated or she moves into a non-technical role), then not including her would produce an 
upward bias.    15
or less, as a detailed temporal examination would not be as useful for cases where the move date is too 
uncertain. Therefore, we drop about 30% of all observed inter-firm mobility events.
19  
Lacking precise information about the move date, we start by calculating the halfway point 
between the last observed date at the source firm and the first observed date at the destination firm. 
However, while the move could have taken place anytime after the start of this window, it would 
probably have taken place at least a few months before the end of the window due to a lag between an 
inventor joining a new firm and filing for a patent there. Further, we take the temporal unit of analysis 
to be the year, rather than the day or month, to avoid any pretence of a precise estimated move date. 
These two factors lead us to define the beginning of the calendar year of the window midpoint 
calculated above as our estimate of when a move happened. Given the high uncertainty in the move 
date, this somewhat ad-hoc assumption is unlikely to do much worse than more sophisticated 
heuristics. On the other hand, it facilitates analysis by allowing classification of each calendar year as 
being either completely before or after a given move, allowing us to work with a patent-year panel.  
As the next step, we follow previous research in matching each focal patent with a corresponding 
control patent (see Figure 2). We choose the control patent such that it originates in another firm, it also 
has a single inventor, and its inventor does not exhibit any inter-firm mobility in the 12 years that 
follow.
20 Having a control patent for each mobile inventor patent helps account for general shifts in the 
technological focus of the destination firm, as those will be reflected in an increased likelihood of citing 
not just the original patent but also the control patent. In the relatively infrequent cases where we cannot 
match the focal patent with a control patent on the above criteria, we drop the patent from the sample.  
These steps lead to a final sample of 7,852 patents, exactly half (3,976 patents) of which are associated 
                                                           
19 Of the remaining, the uncertainty is zero to two years for 65% of the cases and three to four years for the rest. 
Thus, an estimate of the move year based on the midpoint is off by not more than one year in two-thirds of the cases 
and not more than two years for the rest. One might worry about representativeness of the final sample. For 
example, since longer time windows imply fewer patents per year, the dropped observations could pertain to less 
productive inventors. To rule out the possibility of any resulting biases, we redo the analyses reported in the paper 
using different window cutoffs. The main results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
20 What makes same-firm patents inappropriate as controls is the fact that the mobile inventor is very likely to carry 
knowledge about not just her own patent but also about other same-technology patents from the same firm. So using 
those as controls would systematically underestimate the benefits from mobility.    16
with an inventor who subsequently moves (focal patents) and the other half are the corresponding control 
patents. For each of these, we count the annual number of citations made by the destination firm in the 12 
years following the application year (see Figure 3). Having 12 observations for each of the above patents 
results in a patent-year panel of 95,424 observations (we call this the “original sample”).  
One might worry that the conventional matching procedure used above might not produce a set of 
control patents that is sufficiently comparable to the focal patents, despite the weaker comparability 
requirements inherent in our DD approach (comparison of trends) relative to the commonly employed 
cross-sectional approach (comparison of levels).  A more stringent matching procedure would offer two 
potential benefits (Imbens 2004). First, to the extent that the likelihood of treatment (in our case, the 
“mobility event”) correlates with the additional matching criteria employed, we would reduce concerns 
about bias due to endogenous treatment (though not eliminate them, as it is impractical to capture all 
relevant drivers of the move).
21 Second, more stringent matching would also reduce sensitivity of the 
findings to specific functional form assumptions. As Moffitt (2004: 1) notes: “compared to least squares 
estimation of the relationship, with its attendant assumptions of linearity and additivity that can only 
awkwardly be relaxed in full, matching provides a method by which no functional form restrictions on the 
relation between [the variables] need be made.”
22   
To achieve more stringent matching, we employ the CEM procedure (Iacus et al. 2009) and 
construct another sample that relies upon not just a match on the three-digit technology class and 
application year but also on discrete buckets based on five additional criteria: 1) overall pre-move 
citations received by a patent (four buckets: zero citations, one-two citations, three-seven citations, and 
eight or more citations), 2) pre-move citations received from the destination firm (four buckets: zero 
                                                           
21 The consistency of matching-based estimates relies heavily upon a “selection on observables” assumption. Since 
the likelihood of treatment might in reality also depend on unobservables or on observables that are impractical to 
fully match on, any matching-based procedure (in the absence of an exogenous instrument or a natural experiment) 
can only reduce endogeneity concerns rather than completely eliminate them (Heckman and Navarro-Lozano 2004). 
22 The potential benefits from stringent matching must be weighed against the reduced likelihood of finding a match 
and thus the bias that could result if the focal patents that we match are systematically different from the ones that 
we drop. In the results section, we present evidence that this is a real concern in our setting. In the concluding 
section, we return to the implications of and a broader discussion of this point.    17
citations, one citation, two-three citations, and four or more citations), 3) number of previous patents by 
this inventor (three buckets: zero or one patents, two-12 patents, and 13 or more patents), 4) number of 
years since the first patent by this inventor (three buckets: zero or one years, two-nine years, and 10 or 
more years), and 5) the delay between the application and grant date (three buckets: 490 or less days, 491-
832 days, and 833 or more days).
23  
With this set of criteria and corresponding buckets, we are able to find matches for 2,543 of the 
3,976 mobile inventor patents from the “original sample,” resulting in a final sample of 5,086 (2,543 X 2) 
cited patents. Again following a procedure similar to the one described above (and illustrated in Figure 3), 
we construct a patent-year dataset of 61,032 (5,086 X 12) observations, which we call the “CEM sample.” 
Later in the paper we present statistics to demonstrate that the “CEM sample” is indeed better matched 
than the “original sample” and therefore use it for carrying out detailed analyses of how firms exploit the 
prior inventions of new hires. 
 
3.2. Variables  
Dependent Variables 
Table 1 summarizes our dependent variables as well as other key variables.
 24 Our first dependent 
variable, all cites, includes all citations the recruit’s patent receives from the hiring firm in the focal year. 
We define the next dependent variable, cites excluding inventor self-cites, analogously to all cites but 
exclude self-citations made by inventors to their own patents.  By eliminating an inventor’s citations, this 
variable measures the use of an idea by individuals at the destination firm other than the inventor herself. 
This distinction is important since abundant self-exploitation by a recruit may reflect a setting where the 
                                                           
23 Choosing the matching criteria involves a tradeoff between the stringency of the match and the fraction of the 
sample for which a match can be found. We choose to be most stringent on criteria 1) and 2) to ensure that pre-move 
citation patterns are practically identical for the recruit versus control patents. For criteria 3), 4), and 5), we form 
boundaries for the three buckets using the 25
th and 75
th percentiles as cutoffs.  
24 To understand why mean values for the dependent variables appear so small, recall that we are dealing with 
highly disaggregated data: these variables capture citations received by a patent from the firm to which the mobile 
inventor moves. Naturally, the probability of a specific firm citing a specific patent in a specific year is extremely 
low. For example, all cites has a non-zero value for only around 1.8% of the observations in the “original sample.”    18
firm is less able to appropriate the benefits from hiring an inventor with a valuable stock of ideas since its 
ability to exploit her idea may depend on her staying there.  
To the extent that the recruit’s tacit knowledge does diffuse through the destination firm, we are 
interested in estimating how widely this occurs. On the one hand, close interpersonal ties such as those 
formed by collaboration can be very helpful for knowledge diffusion (Hansen 1999, Singh 2005). On the 
other hand, broader intra-firm interpersonal networks or knowledge diffusion mechanisms might enable 
and encourage a wider employee base in the destination firm to build upon the recruit’s prior ideas. To 
examine this issue, we construct another dependent variable, cites excluding inventor self-cites and 
collaborator cites, as the count of citations made by those who have also not directly collaborated (as co-
authors on previous patents) with the inventor before the citing year under consideration.  
Key Explanatory Variables 
Our two key explanatory variables are recruit and post-move. In fact, the estimated coefficient on 
the interaction of these terms is the focus of our empirical analysis.  We use the indicator variable recruit 
to classify inventions made by individuals who are subsequently recruited and move to a new firm, the so-
called destination firm. In other words, we use recruit to distinguish between our “treated” versus 
untreated, or control, patents. We classify a given patent-year observation as post-move if it occurs after 
the estimated move date using the indicator variable post-move.    
Control Variables 
For the pooled estimation models, we employ several control variables, though these are not 
needed in our preferred models that employ patent fixed effects (as they are time-invariant).  Specifically, 
we include controls for key observed characteristics of: 1) the destination firm (overall level of inventive 
activity, level of inventive activity in the same technology class as the recruit’s patent),
25 2) the source 
firm (overall level of inventive activity), 3) the inventor (number of prior patents, number of years since 
                                                           
25 It is important to control for the destination firm’s patent pool since having more patents naturally increases 
citation likelihood to the focal patent, with this tendency being greatest for firms with more patenting activity in the 
same technology. However, to prevent circularity wherein the move itself affects the size of the patent pool, we 
calculate the patent pool as of the move year itself (rather than as of a citing year subsequent to the move).     19
first patent, U.S. resident indicator), and 4) the patent itself (number of claims, number of patent 
references, number of non-patent references, technology area).
26  We provide definitions and descriptive 
statistics for these control variables (except the technology area indicators) in Table 1. 
 
4. RESULTS 
We now report our findings on four topics: 1) a comparison of our estimates for the mobility-
knowledge flow relationship using the traditional cross-sectional method versus our DD approach, 2) an 
estimate of the sensitivity of our findings to the more stringently matched “CEM sample,” 3) an estimate 
of the fraction of the boost in use of the recruit’s prior ideas that is due not to “learning” but rather to 
exploitation of those ideas by the recruit herself, and 4) an estimate of the persistence over time of the 
recruit as the destination firm’s primary user of her stock of prior ideas. 
 
4.1. Summary Statistics 
Before delving into the regression analysis, we present the basic intuition behind our approach 
using summary statistics for the pre-move and post-move subsamples corresponding to the focal versus 
control patents. We report these statistics in Table 2. (It is also helpful to refer to Figures 1 and 3 for 
interpreting these.)  
We begin with the means reported for the variable all cites for each of the four subsamples. 
Recall from Table 1 that this variable is a count of all citations the focal (or control) patent receives from 
the destination firm in a given year, including self-citations made by the inventor after she moves. As the 
column corresponding to the post-move period indicates, focal patents have a greater average annual 
citation rate (0.0396) than control patents (0.0061), reflecting a difference of 0.0335 citations per year 
                                                           
26 While the pooled negative binomial models employ technology indicators at the one-digit NBER category level, 
the pooled linear models employ indicators for the three-digit technology class. Also, we only use inventor age, U.S. 
inventor, and grant delay in the pooled negative binomial models, as the pooled linear estimation allows us to use a 
full set of indicator variables for inventor age (in years), inventor location (U.S. state or non-U.S. country), and grant 
delay (in months). For more discussion on the importance of saturating such models, particularly on the temporal 
dimension, see Levin and Stephan (1991), Hall et al. (2007), and Mehta et al. (2010).     20
between the two. However, it would be misleading to attribute all of this difference to mobility since the 
annual citation rate is greater even pre-mobility (0.0140 for recruits’ patents versus 0.0051 for controls, 
reflecting a difference of 0.0089). Therefore, rather than attributing the whole post-mobility difference to 
the move itself, it seems more reasonable to attribute to the move only the difference, 0.0246 (i.e., 0.0335 
– 0.0089), between the post-mobility and pre-mobility differences.  
We now turn to the analogous calculation for the variable cites excluding inventor self-cites, 
which excludes self-citations made by the mobile inventor to her own patent. The post-move mean for 
cites excluding inventor self-cites for recruits’ patents is 0.0250, which is significantly smaller than the 
corresponding all cites mean of 0.0396, suggesting that roughly 37% (i.e., 1 – (0.0250/0.0396)) of the 
overall citations are self-cites by the mover. Repeating the earlier calculation for cites excluding inventor 
self-cites leads to a DD summary statistic of 0.0100, which is much smaller than the corresponding all 
cites DD statistic of 0.0246. In other words, interpreting overall changes in citation patterns as all being 
“learning-by-hiring” would be a clear overestimation.  
 
4.2. Regression Analysis: Recruiting and the Citation Premium 
Since the above statistics are only meant to illustrate the main intuition behind our DD approach, 
we now turn to the regression framework, which is more appropriate for a rigorous analysis. Table 3 
reports our baseline analysis using the “original sample,” employing all cites as the dependent variable. 
Column (1) reports cross-sectional findings from the post-move subsample, in effect replicating the 
current “best practice” of employing such comparisons of the post-move citation frequency for focal 
versus control patents.
 27 The estimates appear to be both statistically and economically quite significant: 
the citation rate implied by the negative binomial regression coefficients is 566% (e
1.896 - 1) greater in the 
focal sample than in the control sample.  
                                                           
27 For variables that are highly skewed, the pooled regression analysis employs a logarithmic transformation, first 
adding one to allow the transformation even in instances where the value could be zero. The results are robust to 
changing the size of the offset or using the untransformed variables for the analysis.    21
The findings reported in Column (2) highlight why interpreting the above effect as being driven 
entirely due to the inventor move itself is inappropriate. We base the results reported in this column on a 
pooled analysis of the entire “original sample,” with the indicator variable post-move used to distinguish 
the citing years following the move date from those preceding it. The positive and significant coefficient 
on recruit, despite now having a separate term for recruit X post-move, demonstrates that focal patents 
systematically receive more citations even before the move actually takes place. Stated another way, the 
cross-sectional analysis employed in Column (1) confounds selection effects with treatment effects. 
Nevertheless, since the estimate of the coefficient on recruit X post-move is also positive in Column (2), 
we still have evidence consistent with an increase in knowledge use associated with mobility even if the 
effect is smaller than what a cross-sectional analysis would lead us to believe. (Interpreting magnitude of 
interaction effects in non-linear models, particularly in a way that allows cross-model comparison, is not 
straightforward. Therefore, we postpone that discussion until we come to our preferred specification 
below: fully saturated linear models with patent fixed effects.) 
We next replicate the pooled analyses from Columns (1) and (2) using linear models before 
turning to our preferred (fixed effects) specification. As the results in Columns (3) and (4) show, there is 
again clear evidence that focal patents are systematically more highly cited even pre-move.
28 As a 
benchmark note that the average number of citations received by a control patent in the post-move 
subsample is 0.0061 (Table 2). Compared with the Column (3) estimate of 0.0356, this represents a 484% 
(0.0356/0.0061 - 1) increase in citations to the focal patents; this estimate is similar in magnitude to the 
Column (1) estimate discussed earlier.  
The specification employed in Column (4) again takes into account the concern that a cross-
sectional association between mobility and citations confounds selection with treatment. The estimated 
                                                           
28 Given that we are working with highly disaggregated data (citations to a specific patent from a specific firm in a 
specific year), the low R
2 values are not a surprise. The more important statistics here are the F-statistic for the 
model as a whole and the t-statistics for the key variables, which are statistically significant. If increasing R
2 were an 
end in itself, we would use a more aggregate unit of analysis (e.g., firm pairs) to remove unsystematic individual-
level noise. However, doing so would not utilize the longitudinal micro-level information we want to exploit. In fact, 
a low R
2 is common when using such disaggregated data; prominent examples include labor market outcomes (e.g., 
Angrist and Krueger 1994, Malamud and Pop-Eleches 2010) and short-term stock returns (e.g., Llorente et al. 2002).     22
coefficient for recruit X post-move in Column (4) suggests that, once we use recruit to account for the 
systematic difference between focal and control patents that exists even pre-move, a move is associated 
with a smaller but still significant increase of 0.0251 citations per year. Compared to the average number 
of citations received by the focal patents prior to the mobility event (0.0140 from Table 2) and controlling 
for the baseline rise in citations for that technology class as captured by the control patents, this estimate 
implies a 179% (0.0251/0.0140) increase in the citation rate. Comparing the estimates from Columns (3) 
and (4) indicates that selection accounts for almost half, 42% (0.0356/0.0251 – 1), of the effect that cross-
sectional models comparable to our Column (3) would (incorrectly) attribute to the inventor move itself.  
While cross-sectional analyses typically use post-move citation rates for control patents as a 
benchmark, our longitudinal design enables the use of citation rates for the focal patents themselves 
(adjusted for time trends) during the pre-move period as a benchmark. The latter interpretation seems 
more desirable as it is based directly on the “treatment” of interest (while recognizing that we are still 
estimating the “treatment on the treated” since mobility is not assigned randomly, a topic we discuss in 
the conclusion).  A comparison of the natural percentage interpretations associated with the estimates 
from Columns (3) and (4) implies that using a purely cross-sectional comparison of post-move citation 
rates exaggerates the percentage increase in benefits attributable to mobility by 170% (484%/179% - 1).  
Before turning to our DD regression with patent fixed effects using the complete sample, it is 
instructive to examine the estimates for a similar model when we use a sample of just focal patents (no 
controls). This model is still identifiable due to variation in application years and move years across focal 
patents. We report these results in Column (5). Note that since recruit is one for all observations 
corresponding to the focal patents, we no longer separately identify recruit X post-move from post-move. 
Given that the post-move effect itself is positive in the Column (4) model employing both focal and 
control patents, the focal-patent-only sample estimate for recruit X post-move in Column (5) is naturally 
greater. While the difference in magnitudes compared with Column (4) estimates (as well as the estimates 
in subsequent models) is not trivial, it is also not large enough to change the qualitative conclusions.     23
The model estimated in Column (6) is our specification of choice; it employs patent fixed effects 
and includes control patents (although it does not employ our stringent CEM-based matching, an issue we 
turn to shortly). The DD estimate for the coefficient on recruit X post-move is 0.0283, reflecting an 
increase of 202% (0.0283/0.0140) relative to the average number of cites a recruit’s invention receives 
from the destination firm pre-move (after controlling for the baseline increase in citations in that 
technology class). This is our primary estimate of the “recruitment effect.”  
Notice that the Column (6) DD estimate is similar in magnitude to the recruit X post-move 
estimate from the pooled analysis reported in Column (4). This offers additional confidence that once we 
account for observed patent characteristics (including, importantly, the focal patent indicator) and the 
model has been fully saturated, other (unobserved) sources of heterogeneity do not appear to be too major 
a concern when we employ the DD approach. Nevertheless, we continue to employ a fixed effects model 
as the preferred specification going forward. 
At this point, it is useful to take stock of the empirical issues we have addressed so far and those 
that remain outstanding. We have demonstrated that ignoring heterogeneity across patents is problematic 
when making inferences based on a comparison of post-move citations due to selection bias. We have 
also shown that applying a DD approach to panel data can mitigate this issue by exploiting cross-patent 
heterogeneity in pre-move citations to adjust estimates (assuming that focal and control patents are more 
comparable on trends than levels). However, even our DD estimates do not necessarily imply causality. 
For example, it is still possible that an unobserved factor (such as a shift in the specific domain focus of 
the firm that the technology classification match does not capture) drives both the hiring of a specific 
individual and an increased use of their ideas.  
While possibilities such as the one above are difficult to rule out altogether, we can potentially 
further reduce the latitude for non-causal explanations by examining the temporal patterns of knowledge 
use.  In particular, we look for evidence of the destination firm increasing its use of the inventor’s ideas in 
the years prior to the move actually taking place.  Such an uptick would heighten concerns that 
unexplained time trends not directly related to the move might be driving the DD findings.     24
We implement the above by including the additional indicator variables recruit X pre-move 
period 1 and pre-move period 1 in the specification reported in Column (7). The estimated coefficient on 
recruit X pre-move period 1 suggests an annual citation rate that is clearly much smaller (coefficient 
0.0083) in the two years leading up to the move than the average in the years after the move (coefficient 
0.0328, an estimate that would be even greater had we separately estimated the effect for just the two-year 
period post-move). Nevertheless, even this relatively small uptick in citations pre-move causes some 
concern about a time trend independent of the move, raising issues about the comparability of the focal 
and control patents even under the (weaker) DD assumptions. We would ideally prefer that the treated 
and control groups show a similar trend pre-treatment so that we can more confidently assume they would 
continue to follow parallel paths in the post-treatment period (in the absence of the treatment). This 
motivates our efforts to implement a more stringent matching procedure, which we turn to next. 
 
 
4.3. Estimates based on a more stringently matched sample    
Table 4a summarizes several characteristics of focal versus control patents for the “original 
sample” and shows that the two subsamples differ significantly on several key dimensions. In particular, 
focal patents systematically: 1) receive more overall citations, 2) receive more pre-move citations from 
the destination firm, and 3) are created by more experienced inventors. Clearly there is room for 
improving the closeness of the match, especially given the relatively large number of patents per three-
digit technology class that have the same application year.  
As described earlier, we construct an alternate sample (which we call the “CEM sample”) with 
exactly this in mind. Our CEM procedure relies upon not just a match on the three-digit technology class 
and application year (already used in constructing the “original sample”) but also on discrete buckets 
constructed using the first five patent characteristics listed in Table 4a: 1) overall pre-move citations 
received, 2) pre-move citations received from the destination firm, 3) number of previous patents by the 
inventor, 4) number of years since the first patent by the inventor, and 5) the delay between the    25
application and grant dates. A comparison of Table 4b with 4a reveals that the focal and control patent 
subsamples are indeed much more comparable for the “CEM sample” than for the “original sample.” 
Before returning to formal regression analysis for the “CEM sample,” Table 5 reports CEM 
summary statistics corresponding to those reported in Table 2. The pre-move means for citations received 
are now very similar for focal versus control patents since cumulative pre-move citation count is one of 
the matching criteria.
29 This makes interpreting the DD statistic calculation easier and the underlying 
assumptions less stringent, as the estimated DD effect now (roughly) coincides with a direct comparison 
of the focal and control patent citation rates post-move.  
The two main insights from Table 2 persist. First, there is a positive DD effect for all cites, 
suggesting an increase in citation rate attributable to mobility (with the magnitude 0.0296 being 
somewhat greater but not too dissimilar from the value of 0.0246 reported in Table 2 for the “original 
sample”).  Second, comparing the DD statistic for cites excluding inventor self-cites with that for all cites 
(0.0167 versus 0.0296, respectively) again suggests that only a part of the apparent increase associated 
with the move arises from learning-by-hiring; a significant fraction of the destination firm’s jump in 
usage of the recruit’s prior ideas is due to self-citations by the recruit herself. 
Once more, we turn to a regression approach for a more rigorous analysis and report our findings 
in Table 6. For ease of readability, we have replicated all the specifications from Table 3 in Table 6. 
However, one should not compare coefficients across the tables for the first two columns since non-linear 
regression estimates are not directly comparable across samples. The estimated coefficient for recruit in 
Columns (2) and (4) is now (almost) zero, which is not surprising given that the cumulative pre-move 
citation count is one of the CEM criteria. Further evidence of the matching working as expected is that, 
unlike in Table 3, the estimate for recruit X pre-move period 1 (Column (7)) is now (practically) zero, 
indicating no pre-move trend.  
                                                           
29 The stringent matching, however, has come at a cost: the focal patents matched during CEM have systematically 
lower pre-move citations rates (compare Tables 2 and 5). We will return to this point later.    26
Interestingly, the estimates for the DD coefficient of interest – recruit X post-move – are very 
similar to those reported in Table 3. Comparing our preferred specification, Column (6), across tables, we 
find that the estimate of interest is 0.0283 earlier and only slightly greater at 0.0296 now. This offers 
additional confidence in the robustness of the result. We base the remaining analyses reported in the paper 
on the specification of choice (Column (6)) and the “CEM sample,” although the findings are similar 




Next, we explore the extent to which the increase in use of the recruit’s prior ideas is due to 
subsequent inventions by the recruit herself versus diffusion to others in the firm. The analysis reported in 
Table 7 examines this by analyzing the “CEM sample” using fully saturated linear models with patent 
fixed effects (corresponding to Column (6) from Table 6) and two additional dependent variables (already 
defined in Table 1): cites excluding inventor self-cites and cites excluding inventor self-cites and 
collaborators.  For easy comparison, Column (1) reproduces the aggregate findings from Column (6) of 
Table 6 (using all cites as the dependent variable).  
Column (2) uses cites excluding inventor self-cites as the dependent variable, a measure 
analogous to all cites but excluding inventor self-citations. The estimate for recruit X post-move is 
0.0161, which represents only 54% (0.0161/0.0296) of the destination firm’s overall increase in the use of 
the recruit’s prior ideas. In other words, almost half of the boost in use of the recruit’s prior ideas has 
nothing to do with learning at all. Rather, it is due to the recruit building upon her own prior ideas. While 
this may be just as useful for overall value creation, it is likely to reduce the destination firm’s relative 
                                                           
30 Comparing the Column (5) findings from Tables 3 and 6, one might wonder why the “CEM sample” demonstrates 
a greater post-move increase in citation rate than the “original sample” for a focal-patent-only analysis. Recall that 
the “CEM sample” only includes the subset of original focal patents that get matched in the CEM procedure. Further 
analysis reveals that the Column (5) difference is driven primarily by the few focal patents that are highly cited pre-
move but do not find a CEM match on this dimension. When we repeat the “original sample” analysis using just the 
same focal patents as the “CEM sample,” then Column (5) estimates are somewhat greater than the CEM-based 
findings. This is consistent with a view that, for a given sample of focal patents, less stringent matching leads to a 
larger (not smaller) estimated effect of mobility. Note that the difference between the two tables is much smaller in 
our preferred DD specification that includes control patents (Column (6)).    27
bargaining power in terms of the portion of this value it can appropriate (a point we return to in the 
conclusion).  
We further explore the limits to widespread diffusion of the tacit knowledge associated with the 
recruit’s prior ideas by excluding not only the inventor’s self-citations but also citations made by the 
inventor’s collaborators (individuals who appear as co-inventors with the recruit on past patents).
31 The 
analysis reported in Column (3) uses cites excluding inventor self-cites or collaborator cites as the 
dependent variable. The estimated coefficient on recruit X post-move is 0.0095 and represents only 32% 
(0.0095/0.0296) of the overall increase. This further suggests that learning-by-hiring is actually quite 
localized; on average, only a third of the hiring firm’s boost in the use of a recruit’s stock of prior ideas is 
due to individuals other than the recruit and her collaborators. 
 
 
4.5. Do the recruit’s ideas diffuse through the hiring firm over time? 
Finally, we explore the degree to which our “limited learning” result from the prior section 
persists over time. In Table 8, we use nine indicator variables (summarized in Table 1) corresponding to 
five post-move, two-year periods and four pre-move periods, with the two-year period immediately 
preceding the move (corresponding to pre-move period 1) being the reference. For ease of visual 
interpretation, we plot coefficient estimates for the DD interaction effects in Figure 4. 
This figure facilitates three observations. First, with respect to both of our dependent variables, 
all cites and cites excluding inventor self-cites, there is a sharp discontinuity in the annual citation rate at 
the time of the mobility event (without any discernable uptick in the years leading up to it). While the 
tight timing of the mobility-idea usage relationship does not necessarily imply causality, it is certainly 
                                                           
31 In classifying a citation, we use the shortest path of connectedness between the inventors of the cited and citing 
patents. So, if a cited patent’s inventor and some of her former collaborators collectively develop a new patent that 
cites her previous patent, then we classify that citation as an inventor self-cite (rather than a collaborator cite). We 
classify a citation as a collaborator cite only when the citing patent’s inventing team includes one or more former 
collaborators of the cited inventor without involving the cited inventor herself.    28
consistent with the assertion that recruiting facilitates enhanced access to an individual’s ideas. (We 
discuss caveats for this interpretation in the conclusion.)   
Second, a comparison of the estimated citation rate for cites excluding inventor self-cites versus 
all cites in the period immediately following the mobility event illustrates that the recruit accounts for 
approximately half of the hiring firm’s increased use of her ideas right after she arrives.   
Third, and perhaps most surprisingly, comparing the findings for cites excluding inventor self-
cites versus all cites over the duration of the post-move period, we see that the recruit continues to 
account for more than a third of the cites to her prior ideas for at least the first four periods (eight years) 
after her arrival. Although one might expect the recruit’s relative role to diminish rapidly as the 
knowledge associated with her ideas diffuses across her new firm, this actually occurs only very 
gradually: during the first eight years there is only a slight increase in the fraction of cites that are not 
inventor self-cites. In other words, the importance of the recruit to the hiring firm (in terms of her direct 
involvement in the firm’s use of her prior ideas) seems to be relatively persistent over time.  
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
What are the implications of our findings for managers and policymakers? Let us start with our 
finding that firms do indeed increase their use of their recruits' prior ideas. From the policymaker’s 
perspective, it is tempting to conclude from this that restrictions on inter-firm mobility, such as non-
compete covenants, are detrimental for the circulation of ideas and knowledge spillovers that would 
otherwise enhance regional growth. From the point of view of the source firm, one might infer that 
mobility of employees leads to “leakage” of ideas to competitors, an outcome that must be guarded 
against. Finally, for the hiring firm, poaching employees from others seems an attractive way to access 
external ideas. While there may well be merit to all of the above arguments, these conclusions do not 
unambiguously follow from our results. We describe some of the key nuances below. 
First, the policy implications are not obvious. On the one hand, when mobility is restricted, ideas 
are less likely to circulate among different firms in the form of knowledge spillovers, which may indeed    29
inhibit growth. On the other hand, firms may be more willing to invest in innovation and human capital 
development for their employees when they are less worried about inventors leaving and sharing their 
ideas with competitors.  
Second, the implications for the source firm are also nuanced. Although the source firm has lost 
an employee, that individual’s use and diffusion of the ideas that she patented while at the source firm 
may increase the value of those patents, which the source firm could realize through licensing, sale of the 
intellectual property, or some type of strategic partnership. In addition, if she maintains ties with 
individuals in the source firm, then these ties might become a conduit enabling the source firm to better 
access external ideas (Agrawal et al. 2006, Oettl and Agrawal 2008, Corredoira and Rosenkopf 2010). 
Third, even the implications for the hiring firm are more nuanced than they first appear. Our 
findings temper the “learning-by-hiring” view prevalent in the literature. Although we find that others at 
the destination firm do learn about the recruit’s ideas, the role the recruit and her immediate collaborators 
play in realizing the destination firm’s use of her prior ideas is particularly prominent, a phenomena that 
persists over time. This implies that the distribution of bargaining power between the recruit and the 
destination firm may favor the recruit, particularly when the value of her ideas is significant. The extent to 
which the firm itself is able to capture rents from better access to the inventor’s ideas through recruiting is 
therefore not obvious (Becker 1962, Lazear 1986, Coff 1997). 
Managers may be tempted to conclude from the above that active steps are needed to ensure that 
the ideas of new recruits are more widely dispersed and that a smart strategy is therefore to increase 
investments in systems for sharing knowledge so that more individuals utilize the recruit’s ideas and 
consequently reduce the firm’s dependence on the recruit herself. However, before adopting such a view, 
we must consider why we observe the recruit playing such a prominent role. Here, it is important to note 
that although sharing knowledge creates benefits, it also incurs costs. Such costs may arise from an 
increased need for coordination and the opportunity cost of inventors’ time. Individuals engage in 
knowledge sharing up to the point where their private marginal benefit from doing so equals their private 
marginal cost. Therefore, the absence of knowledge sharing among particular individuals in a firm reflects    30
that the benefits from doing so do not outweigh the costs from the perspective of at least one of the 
individuals involved. Firms should only intervene in the knowledge-sharing process if they have reason to 
believe that employees are under-investing in the sharing of knowledge among each other relative to what 
is best for the firm. Employee incentives or investments in systems to promote knowledge sharing may be 
very effective, but managers should keep in mind that pursuing such a strategy relies on the existence of a 
divergence between the objective of the firm and that of its employees. 
In addition, we must also clarify a general limitation to a causal interpretation of our findings.  
Although our use of a longitudinal dataset, a DD estimation approach, and more stringent matching move 
us closer to a causal interpretation than previous related studies afford, we still have a way to go. Due to 
our research design, we are limited in terms of how far we can extrapolate from our specific context to 
other settings. Recall that we construct our sample by identifying patents associated with inventors who 
subsequently move to another firm, interpret this “mobility event” as the “treatment,” and examine its 
affect on patterns of knowledge flow. But mobility is endogenous, not random; firms make deliberate 
choices about whom to recruit for a reason. So what we estimate is not the “treatment effect” per se (the 
effect of recruitment on knowledge flow under random assignment of mobility) but rather the “treatment 
effect on the treated” (the effect of recruitment conditional on a sample of individuals that are actually 
recruited).  
Thus, one must be careful about extending our findings from the treated sample to the overall 
population since the two may have importantly different properties. At a minimum, even if the qualitative 
results reported in the paper hold for the overall population, the magnitude of the effect could be quite 
different. For example, if firms recruit the inventors whose ideas they value most, then the ideas of the 
marginal inventor, the “last” inventor to be recruited, will be less valuable than those of the average 
recruited inventor. This is an important caveat to the implication that firms can increase their access to 
particular ideas by recruiting the inventor. 
In terms of our own interpretation, we prefer using the term “facilitates” rather than “causes.” 
Hiring an inventor does not cause the firm to increase its use of that individual’s ideas, but it may    31
facilitate greater use.  However, even our (weaker) interpretation that mobility facilitates knowledge use 
has limitations. For example, consider a scenario where a firm increases its use of a particular inventor’s 
ideas (without help from the inventor) at exactly the same time that it hires the inventor (for other 
reasons). Although the increase in idea use would take place even in the absence of recruitment, our DD 
model is not able to distinguish this scenario from an observationally similar one where the recruitment 
does facilitate a subsequent rise in idea use. (However, if the scenario instead is that the firm begins to use 
the ideas before the move takes place, then our methodology will correctly spot that the move does not 
drive the boost in the use of the idea.) 
While we have emphasized the benefits of our more stringent CEM-based matching in making 
progress on some of the above issues, the fact that an appropriate match cannot be found for a significant 
fraction of the focal patents also raises questions. As already noted, focal patents that we drop during 
CEM have higher pre-move citations rates. Thus, the “CEM sample” is comprised of patents that, on 
average, are of lower quality and/or lower relevance to the destination firm. On the one hand, this raises 
concerns regarding generalizability of the findings based on this sample. On the other hand, if including 
the dropped patents is problematic anyway (e.g., if greater pre-move citation is symptomatic of more 
severe endogeneity issues), excluding them might actually be desirable. We have no direct way of 
verifying which has more merit. However, it is reassuring to note that our (preferred) DD-based estimates 
for the “original sample” are not too different from those using the “CEM sample.” 
One promising way forward on the causality issue is to find sources of exogenous variation in 
mobility, such as closure of establishments (Dahl and Sorenson 2010), changes in non-compete laws 
(Marx et al. 2009), or death of close colleagues (Azoulay et al. 2010, Oettl 2009). Even in the absence of 
such natural experiments or instruments, however, progress can be made by more explicitly modeling the 
likelihood of being exposed to the (endogenous) treatment. For example, Azoulay et al. (2009) apply the 
“Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighted” estimation approach to model a life scientist's selection 
into patenting behavior by employing rich data on time-varying characteristics of individuals. Researchers 
could use similar methodologies for modeling mobility events based on observables, although doing so    32
convincingly is likely to involve extensive compilation of individual-level data (beyond just the patent-
based characteristics already used in our study). For a better understanding of the antecedents as well as 
consequences of mobility, future research could also benefit from stronger links to the rich literature on 
job matching (e.g., Jovanovic 1979, Simon and Warner 1992). This involves explicitly incorporating the 
dynamic process wherein inter-firm mobility is a result of individuals and firms optimizing their match in 
the labor market. 
The focus of our study is on how mobility enhances access to pre-move knowledge associated 
with the recruit herself.  However, we can further (speculatively) interpret our findings as also providing 
suggestive evidence that hiring facilitates a firm’s overall “absorptive capacity” in a knowledge domain 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1989). Referring back to Column (6) in Table 6, the estimate for post-move is 
significant (even though smaller than the DD estimate corresponding to recruit X post-move). A 
conservative interpretation implicit in our analysis is that this reflects the destination firm’s change in 
technological focus towards knowledge domains related to the recruit’s expertise (from which we also 
draw the control patent). However, we can also give this estimated coefficient a (more speculative) 
interpretation that the recruit may be responsible for improving the firm’s absorptive capacity in this 
knowledge domain, hence driving the post-move boost in citations made even to the control patent. 
Comparing the coefficient on post-move in Column (1) with Column (2) in Table 7, we see that the 
increase in the firm’s use of the control patent is 0.0092 in terms of all cites and 0.0054 in terms of cites 
excluding the mover, suggesting that the mover is indeed responsible for a significant portion of the 
increase in citations to the control patent. This absorptive capacity interpretation is intriguing and worthy 
of further research  
Despite these caveats regarding our research design, our study does offer a methodological 
contribution for those who study mobility and knowledge flows.  Other researchers can apply our idea-
level, longitudinal, DD framework for examining a broad range of mobility-related questions. For 
example, one could examine the destination firm’s use of not just the recruit’s own prior inventions (as in 
this study) but of any prior knowledge that the mobile inventor could serve as a carrier for. This might    33
include access to other knowledge originating from the mover’s original firm or her original geographic 
region. In addition, one might examine how mobility affects not just the destination firm’s use of the 
recruit’s stock of ideas but also use by the source firm or by third parties not directly involved with the 
inventor.  
Extending beyond just usage of knowledge that exists pre-move, researchers could also examine 
other interesting mobility-related relationships using our approach, such as measuring changes in 
productivity of the mover herself or of other employees who might benefit or lose out because of the 
move (Groysberg et al. 2008). Identification issues are likely to be more accentuated for examining such 
questions (Lacetera et al. 2004), although our framework, perhaps with adjustments, might still be useful. 
More generally, any line of inquiry related to the antecedents and consequences of mobility will 
greatly benefit from investigating longitudinal data and emphasizing temporal patterns that bring us closer 
to uncovering underlying relationships and micro-level mechanisms. In this paper, we have offered one 
approach for moving this topic forward. The relationship between inventor mobility and the use of ideas 
is economically important for both firm strategy and public policy, and we still have much to learn.   
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Table 1. Variable definitions and summary statistics for the “original sample” (N = 95,424) 
Dependent variables: Mean Std Dev Min Max
all cites All citations to the focal patent from the destination firm (in the given year) 0.018 0.200 0 11
cites excluding inventor self-cites Destination firm citations coming from individuals other than the patent's 
inventor herself
0.013 0.164 0 11
cites excluding inventor self-cites 
or collaborator cites
Destination firm citations coming from individuals other than the patent's 
inventor herself or any of her prior collaborators
0.011 0.147 0 11
Explanatory & control variables:
recruit Indicator for whether the given patent is a focal patent involving a move or a 
control patent
0.50 0.50 0 1
destination firm patents Number of patents assigned to the destination firm in the five years 
preceding the inventor's move year
1041.9 1433.1 0 8260
destination same-class patents Number of destination firm patents that belong to the same 3-digit technology 
class as the focal patent
26.9 75.8 0 1375
original firm patents Number of patents assigned to the original firm in the five years preceding 
the focal patent's application year
1120.1 1157.0 0 5504
claims Number of claims made by the focal patent 11.53 9.36 1 155
patent references Number of backward citations that the focal patent makes to other patents 6.78 7.01 0 171
non-patent references Number of non-patent references made by the focal patent 0.86 2.28 0 37
inventor patents Number of previous patents successfully applied for by the same inventor 7.76 13.07 0 202
inventor age Number of years since the inventor applied for her first successful patent 4.47 4.34 0 26
U.S. inventor Indicator for whether the focal patent's inventor has a US address or not 0.54 0.50 0 1
grant delay The delay between application date and grant date for the focal patent (in 
months)
22.69 10.82 1 136
Timing-related variables:
post-move Indicator for whether the citing year falls after the estimated move date  0.636 0.481 0 1
pre-move period 1 Indicator for whether the citing year is the 1st or 2nd year before the move 0.167 0.373 0 1
pre-move period 2 Indicator for whether the citing year is the 3rd or 4th year before the move 0.109 0.312 0 1
pre-move period 3 Indicator for whether the citing year is the 5th or 6th year before the move 0.058 0.234 0 1
pre-move period 4 Indicator for whether the citing year is the 7th or 8th year before the move 0.024 0.153 0 1
pre-move period 5 Indicator for whether the citing year is the 9th or 10th year before the move 0.007 0.081 0 1
post-move period 1 Indicator for whether the citing year is the 1st or 2nd year after the move 0.167 0.373 0 1
post-move period 2 Indicator for whether the citing year is the 3rd or 4th year after the move 0.160 0.367 0 1
post-move period 3 Indicator for whether the citing year is the 5th or 6th year after the move 0.143 0.350 0 1
post-move period 4 Indicator for whether the citing year is the 7th or 8th year after the move 0.109 0.311 0 1
post-move period 5 Indicator for whether the citing year is the 9th or 10th year after the move 0.057 0.233 0 1 
Notes: We base the summary statistics on the “original sample” constructed as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 and describe them in 
the notes corresponding to those figures. The overall sample size of 95,424 arises from 12 yearly observations for each of the 
3,976 focal cited patents and another 12 yearly observations for each of the 3,976 control patents.    38
Table 2. Annual patent citation frequency for the “original sample” 
Pre-move Post-move
Patents involving move Subsample mean: Subsample mean: First difference (row):
all cites = 0.0140 all cites = .0396 all cites = 0.0256
cites excluding inventor self-cites = 0.0140 cites excluding inventor self-cites = .0250 cites excluding inventor self-cites = 0.0110
(N = 17383) (N = 30329) (N = 47712)
Control patents Subsample mean: Subsample mean: First difference (row):
all cites = 0.0051 all cites = 0.0061 all cites = 0.0010
cites excluding inventor self-cites = 0.0051 cites excluding inventor self-cites = 0.0061 cites excluding inventor self-cites = 0.0010
(N = 17383) (N = 30329) (N = 47712)
First difference (column): First difference (column): Difference-in-differences:
all cites = 0.0089 all cites = 0.0335 all cites = 0.0246
cites excluding inventor self-cites = 0.0089 cites excluding inventor self-cites = 0.0189 cites excluding inventor self-cites = 0.0100
(N = 34766) (N = 60658) (N = 95424)
Average annual citations received from the destination firm
 
Notes: We base this analysis on the “original sample” constructed as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 and describe it in the notes 
corresponding to those figures. Each box in this “2X2” matrix summarizes the average value of the all cites and cites excluding 
inventor self-cites variables in the corresponding subsample (see Table 1 for variables definitions). Note that all cites and cites 
excluding inventor self-cites are identical pre-move since the inventor is not yet an employee of the destination firm; therefore, by 
construction there are no inventor self-cites from the destination firm that involve this inventor in the pre-move period.  
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Table 3. Difference-in-differences regression analysis for the “original sample” 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable: all cites all cites all cites all cites all cites all cites all cites




Linear Linear Linear           
(Patent FE)
Linear        
(Patent FE)
Linear        
(Patent FE)














recruit 1.896*** 1.017*** 0.0356*** 0.0101***
(0.137) (0.213) (0.0034) (0.0022)
recruit X post-move 0.907*** 0.0251*** 0.0367*** 0.0283*** 0.0328***
(0.230) (0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0027) (0.0035)
post-move 0.157 0.0033 0.0045* 0.0091**
(0.207) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0036)
recruit X pre-move period 1 0.0083**
(0.0042)
pre-move period 1 0.0035
(0.0031)
ln(destination same-class patents) 0.428*** 0.497*** 0.0085*** 0.0075***
(0.050) (0.048) (0.0012) (0.0010)
ln(destination firm patents) -0.215*** -0.202*** -0.0039*** -0.0028***
(0.045) (0.040) (0.0010) (0.0007)
ln(original firm patents) 0.013 0.003 0.0010 0.0008
(0.040) (0.038) (0.0013) (0.0009)
ln(claims) 0.085 0.096 0.0049** 0.0041**
(0.083) (0.078) (0.0024) (0.0018)
ln(patent references) 0.027 0.074 0.0009 0.0019
(0.083) (0.077) (0.0028) (0.0019)
ln(non-patent references) 0.149 0.073 0.0036 0.0018
(0.093) (0.091) (0.0027) (0.0020)
ln(inventor patents) -0.129 -0.112 -0.0013 -0.0007
(0.092) (0.085) (0.0018) (0.0013)
ln(inventor age) 0.112 0.053
(0.105) (0.098)
U.S. inventor 0.662*** 0.611***
(0.156) (0.138)
ln(grant delay) 0.123 -0.011
(0.136) (0.131)
Number of observations 60658 95424 60658 95424 47712 95424 95424
Number of cited patents 7952 7952 7952 7952 3976 7952 7952
Log likelihood -5238 -6806
Wald chi2 841.9*** 48236***
R-squared 0.037 0.029 0.006 0.004 0.004
F-statistic 4.47*** 5.43*** 9.02*** 11.76*** 11.50***  
Notes: We base this regression analysis on the “original sample” already summarized in Tables 1 and 2. All models include 
yearly indicator variables for the citing year and the lag between the cited and citing year. The pooled linear models (Columns (3) 
and (4)) also include indicator variables for the inventor age (in years), inventor location (U.S. states or non-U.S. countries), and 
patent grant delay (in months), though the pooled non-linear models (Columns (1) and (2)) employ inventor age, U.S. inventor, 
and grant delay variables to ensure convergence. We use robust standard errors clustered on the identity of the inventor in all four 
pooled models and employ fixed effects for the cited patent in Columns (5) through (7), though results are practically identical if 
we use fixed effects for the inventor instead. We also obtain qualitatively similar results when we employ a Poisson-based 
conditional fixed effects regression approach, though we do not choose that as our preferred approach for two reasons: 1) the 
estimation does not converge if the model is saturated with as many indicators as the linear models, and 2) we drop a large 
fraction of the sample due to no variation in the dependent variable. Note that the reference period for interpreting the 
“difference-in-differences” (DD) estimate of interest – recruit X post-move – is the entire pre-move period for Columns (2), (4), 
(5), and (6) but the pre-move period excluding the two years just before the move in Column (7). A comparison of Columns (1) 
and (2) as well as of Columns (3) and (4) indicates that purely cross-sectional results as reported in Columns (1) and (3) can be 
misleading since mobile inventor patents receive systematically more citations than control patents even pre-move. Furthermore, 
the positive and significant estimate for recruit X pre-move period 1 in Column (7) suggests that the upward trend in citation rate 
in part starts pre-move, suggesting the need for a more stringent matching for at least partially mitigating concerns regarding 
endogeneity of the move. 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1     40
Table 4a. Mobile inventor patent versus control patent characteristics in the “original sample” 
obs mean std dev obs mean std dev magnitude t-stat
Cumulative overall pre-move citations 3976 2.98 4.50 3976 2.42 3.88 0.57 6.0
Cumulative pre-move citations from destination 3976 0.063 0.461 3976 0.023 0.272 0.040 4.8
Inventor patents 3976 9.13 14.64 3976 5.87 12.27 3.26 10.8
Inventor age 3976 4.98 4.29 3976 3.96 4.32 1.02 10.6
Grant delay 3976 22.78 10.72 3976 22.59 10.91 0.19 0.8
Claims 3976 11.73 9.68 3976 11.32 9.02 0.40 1.9
Patent references 3976 6.92 7.40 3976 6.64 6.58 0.28 0.7
Non-patent references 3976 0.88 2.32 3976 0.84 2.23 0.03 1.8
Originality (NBER measure) 3843 0.34 0.27 3828 0.35 0.28 -0.01 0.9
Control patents Patents involving move Difference in means
 
Notes: The “originality” measure (taken from the NBER database) measures breadth of search across different technology classes 
and corresponds to one minus the Herfindahl of the backward citations made by a patent to previous patents from different 
technologies (and is therefore undefined for patents with no backward citations). Note that the means of several key 
characteristics of the focal and control patents differ significantly, motivating the need for a more stringent matching approach as 
summarized in Table 4b. 
 
Table 4b. Mobile inventor patent versus control patent characteristics in the “CEM sample” 
obs mean std dev obs mean std dev magnitude t-stat
Cumulative overall pre-move citations 2543 2.55 3.76 2543 2.50 3.83 0.05 0.5
Cumulative pre-move citations from destination 2543 0.010 0.136 2543 0.010 0.136 0.000 0.0
Inventor patents 2543 7.59 11.36 2543 7.40 14.52 0.19 0.5
Inventor age 2543 4.50 4.05 2543 4.61 4.18 -0.12 1.0
Grant delay 2543 23.11 10.62 2543 22.95 10.58 0.16 0.6
Claims 2543 11.39 9.01 2543 11.18 8.67 0.21 0.8
Patent references 2543 6.40 5.97 2543 6.38 5.25 0.02 0.1
Non-patent references 2543 0.85 2.14 2543 0.78 1.98 0.07 1.2
Originality (NBER measure) 2464 0.33 0.28 2457 0.34 0.28 -0.01 1.4
Patents involving move Control patents Difference in means
 
Notes: We construct the “CEM sample” using a CEM procedure that relies upon not just an exact match on the three-digit 
technology class and application year (used in constructing the “original sample”) but also on an exact match on discrete buckets 
based on five additional criteria: 1) overall pre-move citations received by a patent (four buckets: zero citations, one-two 
citations, three-seven citations, and eight or more citations), 2) pre-move citations received from the destination firm (four 
buckets: zero citations, one citation, two-three citations, and four or more citations), 3) number of previous patents successfully 
filed for by this inventor (three buckets: zero or one patents, two-12 patents, and 13 or more patents), 4) number of years since 
the first patent by this inventor (three buckets: zero or one years, two-nine years, and 10 or more years), and 5) the delay between 
the application date and grant date for the patent (three buckets: 490 or less days, 491-832 days, and 833 or more days). Also note 
that the overall sample size is now smaller – there are 2,543 focal patents and as many corresponding control patents in contrast 
to 3,976 focal patents and as many control patents in Table 4a – since we drop the mobile inventor patents for which we find no 
match in the CEM procedure. A comparison of Tables 4a and 4b reveals that the mobile inventor patents and control patents are 
much more comparable for the “CEM sample” than for the “original sample” on a variety of key characteristics.     41
Table 5. Annual patent citation frequency for the “CEM sample” 
Pre-move Post-move
Patents involving move Subsample mean: Subsample mean: First difference (row):
all cites = 0.0022 all cites = .0345 all cites = 0.0323
cites excluding inventor self-cites = 0.0022 cites excluding inventor self-cites = .0216 cites excluding inventor self-cites = 0.0194
(N = 10981) (N = 19535) (N = 30516)
Control patents Subsample mean: Subsample mean: First difference (row):
all cites = 0.0022 all cites = .0049 all cites = 0.0027
cites excluding inventor self-cites = 0.0022 cites excluding inventor self-cites = .0049 cites excluding inventor self-cites = 0.0027
(N = 10981) (N = 19535) (N = 30516)
First difference (column): First difference (column): Difference-in-differences:
all cites = 0 all cites = 0.0296 all cites = 0.0296
cites excluding inventor self-cites = 0 cites excluding inventor self-cites = 0.0167 cites excluding inventor self-cites = 0.0167
(N = 21962) (N = 39070) (N = 61032)
Average annual citations received from the destination firm
 
Notes: This analysis replicates the summary analysis from Table 2 (based on the “original sample”) for the “CEM sample.” Note 
that the pre-move means for citations received are now practically the same for the focal and control patents, since cumulative 
pre-move citation count is one of the criteria used for the matching done in constructing the “CEM sample.” Also note that the 
overall sample size is now smaller – 61,032 here versus 95,424 in Table 2 – since we drop the mobile inventor patents for which 
we do not find the more stringent match when constructing the “CEM sample.” 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1     42
Table 6. Difference-in-differences regression analysis for the “CEM sample” 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable: all cites all cites all cites all cites all cites all cites all cites




Linear Linear Linear           
(Patent FE)
Linear        
(Patent FE)
Linear        
(Patent FE)
Patent-Year Sample: CEM sample     
(post move only)
CEM         
sample
CEM sample     
(post move only)
CEM        
sample
CEM sample     
(focal patents only)
CEM         
sample
CEM       
sample
recruit 1.927*** 0.007 0.0316*** 0.0012
(0.185) (0.376) (0.0040) (0.0013)
recruit X post-move 1.945*** 0.0295*** 0.0447*** 0.0296*** 0.0289***
(0.407) (0.0039) (0.0048) (0.0029) (0.0038)
post-move 0.895*** 0.0069** 0.0092*** 0.0115***
(0.319) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0039)
recruit X pre-move period 1 -0.0012
(0.0045)
pre-move period 1 0.0028
(0.0034)
ln(destination same-class patents) 0.450*** 0.509*** 0.0076*** 0.0056***
(0.067) (0.066) (0.0013) (0.0009)
ln(destination firm patents) -0.275*** -0.272*** -0.0037*** -0.0024***
(0.059) (0.057) (0.0011) (0.0007)
ln(original firm patents) -0.066 -0.063 -0.0016 -0.0010
(0.051) (0.049) (0.0018) (0.0012)
ln(claims) -0.014 -0.014 0.0022 0.0012
(0.108) (0.106) (0.0032) (0.0021)
ln(patent references) 0.207* 0.182* 0.0050 0.0033
(0.113) (0.107) (0.0035) (0.0023)
ln(non-patent references) 0.053 0.082 -0.0009 -0.0000
(0.125) (0.121) (0.0029) (0.0019)
ln(inventor patents) -0.175 -0.133 -0.0022 -0.0013
(0.117) (0.114) (0.0023) (0.0015)
ln(inventor age) 0.158 0.092
(0.145) (0.141)
U.S. inventor 0.544*** 0.411**
(0.198) (0.188)
ln(grant delay) -0.103 -0.119
(0.192) (0.183)
Number of observations 39070 61032 39070 61032 30516 61032 61032
Number of cited patents 5086 5086 5086 5086 2543 5086 5086
Log likelihood -4153 -4525
Wald chi2 988.9*** 42198***
R-squared 0.033 0.025 0.009 0.006 0.006
F-statistic 2.93*** 3.48*** 13.12*** 18.66*** 17.64***  
 
Notes: The regression models employed here are identical to the corresponding ones employed in Table 3, including all indicator 
variables not reported in that table to conserve space, but the sample used is now the “CEM sample.” The sample sizes are now 
smaller since we drop patents for which the CEM procedure does not find a match when constructing the “CEM sample.” Unlike 
in Table 3, the estimated coefficient for recruit in Columns (2) and (4) are practically zero since the cumulative pre-move citation 
count is one of the matching criteria used in constructing the “CEM sample.” Further evidence of the matching working well is 
that the estimate for recruit X pre-move period 1 (Column (7)) is now practically zero, indicating that there is no pre-move trend 
in the citation rate.   
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1  
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Table 7. Learning-by-hiring? 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: all cites cites excluding 
inventor self-cites
cites excluding 
inventor self-cites or 
collaborator cites
Regression Model: Linear              
(Patent FE)
Linear              
(Patent FE)
Linear             
(Patent FE)
Patent-Year Sample: CEM sample CEM sample CEM sample
recruit X post-move 0.0296*** 0.0161*** 0.0095***
(0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0020)
post-move 0.0092*** 0.0054** 0.0067***
(0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0020)
Number of observations 61032 61032 61032
Number of cited patents 5086 5086 5086
F-statistic 11.31*** 6.03*** 4.18***  
 
Notes: We base this regression analysis on the “CEM sample” already used in Table 6. We use our preferred specification as in 
Column (6) of Tables 3 and 6 (including all indicator variables not reported to conserve space). For ease of comparison, Column 
(1) simply replicates the analysis from Column (6) of Table 6, which uses all cites as the dependent variable. In Column (2), we 
examine the extent to which the estimated boost in citation rates post-mobility diminishes when citation counts exclude inventor 
self-cites. Similarly, in Column (3), we analyze the extent to which the estimated boost in citation rates post-mobility diminishes 
when citation counts exclude not just inventor self-cites but also cites made by collaborators in the destination firm. Note that the 
reference period for interpreting the DD estimate of interest – recruit X post-move – is the entire pre-move period.  
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1     44
Table 8. Does the importance of self-exploitation by the recruit persist over time? 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: all cites cites excluding 
inventor self-cites
cites excluding 
inventor self-cites or 
collaborator cites
Regression Model: Linear             
(Patent FE)
Linear             
(Patent FE)
Linear             
(Patent FE)
Patent-Year Sample: CEM sample CEM sample CEM sample
recruit X post-move period 1 0.0378*** 0.0197*** 0.0165***
(0.0045) (0.0037) (0.0032)
recruit X post-move period 2 0.0348*** 0.0196*** 0.0118***
(0.0045) (0.0037) (0.0032)
recruit X post-move period 3 0.0326*** 0.0186*** 0.0064*
(0.0047) (0.0038) (0.0033)
recruit X post-move period 4 0.0125** 0.0078* 0.0054
(0.0051) (0.0042) (0.0036)
recruit X post-move period 5 0.0157** 0.0131** 0.0086*
(0.0065) (0.0053) (0.0045)
recruit X pre-move period 2 0.0023 0.0023 0.0032
(0.0052) (0.0042) (0.0036)
recruit X pre-move period 3 0.0046 0.0034 0.0034
(0.0066) (0.0054) (0.0046)
recruit X pre-move period 4 0.0047 0.0049 0.0043
(0.0098) (0.0080) (0.0069)
recruit X pre-move period 5 0.0017 0.0002 -0.0007
(0.0184) (0.0151) (0.0130)
post-move period 1 0.0053 0.0032 0.0031
(0.0042) (0.0034) (0.0030)
post-move period 2 0.0090 0.0043 0.0038
(0.0063) (0.0051) (0.0044)
post-move period 3 0.0122 0.0049 0.0041
(0.0087) (0.0071) (0.0061)
post-move period 4 0.0160 0.0066 0.0052
(0.0112) (0.0092) (0.0079)
post-move period 5 0.0207 0.0080 0.0041
(0.0139) (0.0114) (0.0098)
pre-move period 2 -0.0041 -0.0017 -0.0012
(0.0045) (0.0036) (0.0031)
pre-move period 3 -0.0042 0.0009 0.0021
(0.0070) (0.0057) (0.0049)
pre-move period 4 -0.0108 -0.0032 -0.0012
(0.0104) (0.0085) (0.0073)
pre-move period 5 -0.0189 -0.0087 -0.0058
(0.0167) (0.0136) (0.0117)
Number of observations 61032 61032 61032
Number of cited patents 5086 5086 5086
F-statistic 8.46*** 4.39*** 3.21***  
 
Notes: Again using the “CEM sample” and the same underlying regression model (including all unreported indicator variables), 
this analysis extends from Table 7 by employing fine-grained indicator variables for a series of two-year time windows pre-move 
as well as post-move in order to examine the temporal patterns of citation rate changes associated with the move. Note that, 
unlike in Table 7, the reference period for interpreting the regression estimates is now pre-move period 1 (the omitted timing 
category). Figure 4 graphically illustrates the DD results (i.e., the interaction term coefficients) from this table.  
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1    45













Ra = actual citation rate for the recruit’s patent
Re = extrapolated citation trend for the recruit’s patent
Ca = actual citation rate for the control patent
Ce = extrapolated citation trend for the control patent
 
 
Notes: This figure motivates our DD approach for examining how firms exploit the prior inventions of new recruits. The key point is that a post-move comparison of the citation 
rates for focal versus control patents ignores the possibility that these citation rates may differ not just due to the recruit’s move per se but also because focal versus control patents 
might be inherently different to start with. Our DD approach in controlling for the latter involves extrapolating from information on citations received pre-move to estimate the 
likely citation trends if the move does not take place. Crudely speaking, we can better estimate the effect of mobility as a DD statistic (Ra – Re) – (Ca – Ce) instead of calculating it 
as just a post-move difference (Ra – Ca). We can further reduce potential biases in the estimates that might still arise from the endogeneity of the move by matching the focal and 
control patents more stringently using pre-move citation trends and inventor-related information. We do this in the construction of our “CEM sample.”    46




















Notes: We begin the sample construction process by identifying a set of focal patents, each created by a single inventor who subsequently moves to another firm between the third 
and 10
th year after the original patent’s application date. (Excluding the first two years ensures a pre-move observation window, data upon which the DD approach relies.) In 
constructing the “original sample,” we match each focal patent with a “control” patent (from a different firm and by a single inventor who shows no evidence of moving in the first 
12 years) such that each control patent has the same application year and three-digit primary technology class as the corresponding focal patent.  Construction of the “CEM 
sample” follows a similar procedure except that we use additional observables (including pre-move citation and inventor information) to carry out a more stringent match between 
focal and control patents using the CEM technique.    47
Figure 3. Constructing a longitudinal dataset of citations received from the destination firm  
 
 
Recruit’s     
Patent
Control         
Patent





C1984 C1985 C1986 C1987 C1988 C1989 C1990 C1991 C1992 C1993 C1994 C1995
Rt = citations received by the recruit’s prior patent from the destination firm in year t
Ct = citations received by the matched control patent from the destination firm in year t
 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates how we use either of the matched samples of patents as described in the notes to Figure 3 to construct a longitudinal patent-year dataset of citations to 
employ for our DD analysis. The resulting dataset has 12 yearly observations for each (focal or control) cited patent, corresponding to the 12 years directly following the patent’s 
application year. In the above example, the focal patent (involving a future move) and the corresponding control patent originate in year 1983, so each of them gives rise to one 
observation per year for the period 1984-1995. We show the estimated move date to be January 1, 1988, so we classify the four annual observations corresponding to the period 
1984-1987 as being pre-move (indicator post-move = 0) and the eight annual observations corresponding to the 1988-1995 as post-move (indicator post-move = 1). Following a 
similar procedure, we construct the “original sample” to have 95,424 observations (3,976 X 12 X 2) corresponding to 3,976 focal patents and as many corresponding control 
patents. In contrast, the “CEM sample” has 61,032 observations (2,543 X 12 X 2) corresponding to 2,543 focal patents and as many corresponding control patents, since we drop 
the focal patents that cannot find a match when employing the stringent CEM procedure.  
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Figure 4. Estimated temporal trends in citations received from the destination firm 
 





















































Notes: This figure plots the DD estimates from regression analysis of temporal patterns of citation rate changes associated with the move, as reported in Table 8. Specifically, it 
plots the interaction coefficients of recruit with different pre-move and post-move periods as listed in the table. Since the reference period for the regression analysis is pre-move 
period 1, the DD coefficient for that period is set to zero in plotting the regression coefficients above. We base these results on analysis of the “CEM sample.”  
 
 
  
 